“What is red does not have to be white. What is not a horse is not necessarily a human.”

[Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle 6, 1077A]

I. Introduction

In both East and West, arguably few figures are as controversial as Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. As early as 532 AD, even before it was revealed to be pseudonymous, authorship of the Corpus Dionysiacum (herafter, CD) was looked upon with suspicion by Hypatius of Ephesus who considered it to be a forgery. In fact, Hypatius’ argument is but a foretaste of controversy that would surround the Dionysian corpus for the rest of the church’s history:

Those testimonies which you say are of the blessed Dionysius, how can you prove that they are authentic, as you claim? For if they are in fact by him, they would not have escaped the notice of blessed Cyril. Why do I speak of the blessed Cyril, when the blessed Athanasius, if in fact he had thought them to be by Dionysius, would have offered these same testimonies concerning the consubstantial Trinity before all others at the council of Nicea against Arius’ blasphemies of the diverse substance. But if none of the ancients made mention of them, I simply do not know how you can prove that they were written by Dionysius.[1]

Since Hypatius, theologians and philosophers from East and West, Christian and non-Christian alike, have either condemned or praised Pseudo-Denys for his genius. Pseudo-Denys and his writings have been described by various thinkers with a number of contradictory labels: Christian, Neoplatonist, Procline, Monophysite, Chalcedonean, Gnostic, agnostic, mystical, rationalist, apophatic, ontotheological, Derridean, Heideggerian, postmodern, etc. It has become almost impossible to identify the roots of Dionysius’ thinking, much less his actual identity.

So much ink has been spilled over Dionysius’ heritage and legacy that few have risen to question the general approach to the CD.[2] Much like modern quests for the historical Jesus, investigations into a history behind the text seem to overlook the ‘canonical’ situation of the text itself.[3] As Sarah Coakley puts it, “The modern quest for Dionysian ‘authenticity’ (Platonism versus Christianity) has bracketed the possibility of such a natural convergence of the ‘unknown God’ with Pauline Christianity.”[4] I argue that the writings of the Pseudo-Areopagite must be, albeit somewhat artificially, situated within the biblical realm (i.e., in front of the Areopagus) in order to be understood properly and not taken as a theology proper (which, for example, attempts to use Dionysius’ authority to implicitly argue for or against a particular christology). This way avoids imputing higher ambitions to the author of the CD than are actually present; more specifically, by understanding the Dionysian writings within their fictitious context, they can be understood as further explications of what the apostle Paul meant when he spoke of the ‘unknown God’ in Acts 17 (and Romans 1).

II. The Quest for the Historical Denys
(Or: Will the Real Pseudo-Dionysius of Areopagite Please Stand Up?)

. . . he charges me with making unholy use of Greek things to attack the Greeks. It would be more correct to say to him in reply that it is the Greeks who make unholy use of godly things to attack God. They try to banish divine reverence by means of the very wisdom which God has given them.

[Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle 7, 1080AB.]

The critical attitude evinced in Hypatius of Ephesus above is encountered more forcefully in the Reformers. The revelation of Dionysius’ pseudonymity by Lorenzo Valla and Erasmus of Rotterdam, among others, “rendered the Dionysian tradition irrelevant to the burning debate about Church authority.”[5] Luther wrote that Denys “hardly shows any signs of solid learning,” and “If one were to read and judge without prejudice, is not everything in it his own fancy and very much like a dream?”[6] In fact, not only did Luther consider Pseudo-Dionysius to be a terrible theologian, “he is downright dangerous, for he is more of a Platonist than a Christian.”[7] Finally, stating an opinion shared by all the Reformers, Luther wrote, “Let us rather hear Paul, that we may learn Jesus Christ and him crucified. He is the way, the life, and the truth; he is the ladder by which we come to the Father.”[8]

Similarly, Calvin, though more cautious than Luther (as is typical), argued that the Areopagite’s “shrewd and subtle disquisitions in his Celestial Hierarchy . . . are merely idle talk,” and such “nugatory wisdom” should be put aside for the “simple doctrine of Scripture.”[9] For Calvin, Pseudo-Dionysius epitomized the speculative theology of the ‘schoolmen.’ Like Luther, Calvin saw that in contrast to Pseudo-Denys the apostle Paul offered a safer alternative: the latter, “though he was carried to the third heaven, so far from delivering any thing of the kind, positively declares, that it was not lawful for man to speak the secrets which he had seen.”[10] In line with Calvin’s assessment, the protestant scholastic, Francis Turretin dedicated an entire question (spanning about five pages) to the “hierarchies of Dionysius.”[11] After proving that “the name ‘Areopagite’ is falsely given,” Turretin concluded, “These things savor of Platonism and not of Paulinism.”[12] According to Froehlich, “the new dating almost universally accepted in Protestant circles, opened the way for a more historical though often polemical approach to the enigmatic texts.”[13] Thus, for Protestants, the dubious authorship as well as the explicitly platonic strands going through Dionysius’ writings rendered him almost absolutely unacceptable as a theologian. As Douglas Farrow put it more recently, “the Dionysian Jesus is more akin to the cosmic Christ of Origen than to that of Irenaeus.”[14]

Surprisingly, the Reformers are not alone in their suspicion. Some theologians within the Eastern tradition have also expressed skepticism towards the Dionysian legacy. According to John Meyendorff, one of the most vocal Eastern Orthodox critics, the Areopagite’s conception of the Church is “clearly dominated by the Platonic opposition between the sensible and the intelligible.”[15] Examining Dionysius’ definition of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, Meyendorff writes, “Dionysius remains fundamentally a prisoner of the sense-mind dichotomy, and . . . he lacks the philosophical means to express the realities linked with the incarnation.”[16] In similar fashion, Kenneth Paul Wesche writes, “Although Ps.-Dionysius offers a profound spiritual vision, we cannot share that his chief inspiration was the Christian faith.”[17] For both the Reformers and certain Eastern theologians, then, far from helping Christianity, Pseudo-Dionysius harmed it by smuggling foreign (specifically Neoplatonic) elements into Christian theology and, therefore, cannot be trusted.

Such a bleak painting of the reception of the CD within the history of the Church without mention of Denys’ enthusiastic supporters would be inaccurate to say the least. Much to the dismay of critics, “The theology of the Areopagite was seen and used for a thousand years and longer as one of the basic forms of the Church’s theology.”[18] Even for the above-mentioned Hypatius of Ephesus, despite suspicions regarding the authorship of the CD, “His statements are directed against its historicity, not its orthodoxy.”[19] In fact, “Representatives of just about every major Christological party in the early sixth century at some point appealed to the authority of Dionysius.”[20] As Christian Schäfer describes, more than the author’s “hagionym and alleged Apostolic discipleship . . . it was foremost and above all the philosophical and theological content of the writings that rendered it immune to all criticism concerning its dubious authorship and origin.”[21] Despite the initial darkness surrounding the Pseudo-Areopagite’s real identity, then, his philosophy and theology eventually caused him to gain a strong foothold in the church’s theology.[22]

What to make of this mixed Dionysian legacy? On the one hand are those who argue, with Luther and the Reformers, that Pseudo-Dionysius is ‘more of a Platonist than a Christian,’ compromising the Christian faith in order to appeal to philosophy, and, therefore, should be rejected and ignored. On the other hand are the more optimistic supporters who argue that, far from platonizing Christianity, “it was a matter of the convictions expressed through language and by means of whatever methods were to hand.”[23] From this latter perspective Denys was not a Neoplatonist wolf in sheep’s clothing, but a Christian expressing the truth of Christianity in Neoplatonic garb—spolia Aegyptiorum. As Hans Urs von Balthasar says, “Denys therefore does not want to borrow, but rather to return what has been borrowed from its true owner.”[24]

Though the question of Pseudo-Dionysius’ Neoplatonic philosophy is certainly not unimportant, it seems that a different approach to the corpus might render new light to an old (and often tiring) discussion. Rather than begin another quest, Schäfer is right to recommend, “we should rather interpret the Areopagitic writings according to the fictitious, yet openly programmatic claims of their author.”[25]

III. “To an Unknown God”

And such a one, precisely because he neither sees him nor knows him, truly arrives at that which is beyond all seeing and knowledge. Knowing exactly this, that he is beyond everything perceived and conceived, he cries out with the prophet, “Knowledge of you is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain it.”

[Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle 5, 1073A.]

            Common to most criticisms of the substance of Pseudo-Dionysius’ writings is the relative independence of his theology from the fundamental Christian event: the Incarnation. This criticism is visible in Luther and the Reformers, as well as modern Eastern Orthodox theologians. For instance, Kenneth Paul Wesche, arguing that ‘gnosis’ is the central element of Denys’ thought, writes, “Dionysius’ vision finally renders superfluous the Incarnation of Christ.”[26] Similarly, Meyendorff refers to “the symbolic Gnosticism of pseudo-Dionysius,” responsible for Denys’ Incarnational negligence, as one of his unfortunate legacies.[27] For the two Eastern Orthodox theologians, the paucity of explicit reference to the Incarnation in the CD is to be attributed to the Areopagite’s inability to make room for it due to his pre-formed Neoplatonic ‘system.’

Such approaches fail, however, inasmuch as they overlook the ‘canonical’ context of Dionysius’ writings.[28] A quick look over Paul’s speech to the Athenians (Acts 17:22-32) reveals that a great bulk of it consists in explicating this ‘unknown God’ apart from the Incarnation (mentioned finally in v. 31). One might similarly understand Dionysius’ explication of God who is ‘beyond being’ (an unmistakably Neoplatonic idea). Denys asks, “If God cannot be grasped by mind or sense-perception, if he is not a particular being, how do we know him?”[29]  This is the fundamental aporia that philosophy finds itself in. How does one understand a God who ‘made the world and everything in it’ (and in whom ‘we live and move and have our being’—immanence) and therefore is beyond all things since he does not need anything nor is served by human hands (transcendence). To wonder why the incarnation does not enter at this undoubtedly philosophical point and find fault is to fault Paul himself. Such an approach mistakes Denys’ primary aim: to establish first the utter transcendence of the God who immanently upholds all things. It is only when the Incarnation is an incarnation of this God who is ‘beyond being’ that the gospel can be properly understood.

Though a bit childish, it may help the reader to imagine stepping into the shoes of Dionysius the Areopagite of the biblical narrative. It would be fundamentally misguided for a Greek standing at the Areopagus, knowing nothing of Christianity, to inquire into the ‘real identity’ (or referent) of the altar to the ‘unknown god.’ The Neoplatonic elements within Denys’ theology function similarly.[30] Inasmuch as Pseudo-Denys utilizes Neoplatonic philosophy in an apophatic fashion (i.e., ‘to an unknown God’), he is simply imitating Paul at the Areopagus. Thus, the Incarnation is not reduced to an accidental element in Dionysius’ thought. It is precisely for the sake of the Incarnation that Denys emphasizes the ‘unknowability’ of God—in order not to identify an ontic idol with the God in Christ.[31] He does not mention Jesus Christ after the fact in order to maintain the outward ‘Christianness’ of his otherwise purely Neoplatonic philosophy (assuming that the two are at odds) as Wesche and Meyendorff assume. Marion argues, “To suppose that manifestation coincides with obscurity in Denys because, as is too often repeated, the Christ occupies only a secondary, superficial role, would here be a misinterpretation.”[32] Rather than confusing manifestation with obscurity (better termed ‘hiddenness’ here), Denys expresses the latter for the sake of the former. But such a manifestation does not and cannot finally come from Neoplatonic philosophy (or any philosophy at all for that matter), but from God’s revelation in Christ.

The question to be asked, then, is not whether Denys’ theological ‘system’ is built on the Incarnation (this is what Meyendorff and Wesche want to know), but whether his philosophical ‘altar’ is sufficiently apophatic (i.e., is this an altar ‘to an unknown god’?).

IV: True Philosophy

This knowledge of beings, which he rightly calls philosophy and which the divine Paul described as the ‘wisdom of God,’ should have led true philosophers to be uplifted to him who is the Cause not only of all beings but also of the very knowledge which one can have of these beings.

[Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle 7, 1080B]

To ask about Denys’ philosophical altar assumes that he has one, and if he does, it cannot be a purely ‘Christian’ one since the Athenians lacked such a thing (otherwise why would Paul need to evangelize to them in the first place!).[33] As Schäfer argues,

. . . there is no doubt, according to the claimed authorship of the Areopagite, that the author of DN speaks as though revealing (the processional essence of) the “unknown God” of Greek—Platonic—philosophy to cultivate Greeks, just as Paul ventured to do in Athens (Acts 17:18-33) and before “certain philosophers of the Epicureans, and of the Stoics” (Acts 17:18).[34]

This leads to a point touched upon throughout this paper: Pseudo-Dionysius’ philosophy is undeniably Neoplatonic; more specifically, his philosophy closely follows that of Proclus.[35] As Hankey describes: “Dionysius not only shares vocabulary with the Neoplatonists, he lifts long passages from them.”[36]

This, however, is not problematic. Denys’ dependence on Procline Neoplatonism doesn’t necessarily entail an anti-Christian philosophy, nor does it entail philosophy’s identity with Christianity.[37] As Schäfer describes, “It seems as though Dionysius’ thinking is an exemplary exercise (and a rather accomplished one, I might add) of how, according to the Apostle’s preaching in Rom 1:19f., Greek thought could have achieved true knowledge of the true God had it not gone astray.”[38] In other words, Denys’ work functions as something of a ‘natural theology’ after the vein of Paul at Areopagus. Again, Schäfer helpfully observes, “In Dionysius, everything seems ‘archetypal,’ not singularly unique or non-recurring. In a certain way, however, this is exactly the ‘Pauline’ grounds on which the teaching of the Areopagite stands.”[39]

Once Denys is read in his ‘canonical’ context, it makes little sense to judge the form of his thought by theological standards lying outside of the Areopagus.[40] It is from this angle that one can understand Pseudo-Dionysius when he writes, “As for the love of Christ for humanity, the Word of God, I believe, uses this term to hint that the transcendent has put aside its own hiddenness and has revealed itself to us by becoming a human being.”[41] Or again, “ . . . and though himself beyond being, he took upon himself the being of humans.”[42] It is precisely the God ‘beyond being,’ the ‘unknown God,’ who has condescended to man and become a man. The Incarnation may not form the center of the Areopagite’s theology in a way like Barth, but this does not mean that the Incarnation does not ‘fit.’ In one sense, the Incarnation qua revelation can never ‘fit’ into a philosophy but must be given to it. This is precisely what occurs in Denys’ thinking. For Denys, “that tremendous ascending movement of negation . . . is kindled only—and ever more brightly—by God’s movement of descent as he imparts himself in manifestations.”[43] The unknown god cannot itself reveal the God beyond being, but it does bring one to the point of unknowing darkness, the place where only the Father of Jesus Christ can say, “Let light shine out of darkness” (2 Cor. 4:6).

V. Conclusion

Placing Pseudo-Denys within his ‘canonical context’ only solves the formal problem of how to approach the CD—it continues to leave unanswered questions regarding the content (though it does have a tremendous impact on how one views the content). This paper dealt primarily with the Divine Names and Epistles of the CD, while the Celestial Hierarchy and Ecclesiastical Hierarchy remain to be discussed at greater length.[44] It is my hope that a ‘canonical’ approach will enable a less polemical, and more charitable understanding of Pseudo-Dionysius than various attempts to get ‘behind the text’ in order to figure out whether it is Proclus or Paul who is speaking through Denys. Schäfer offers a helpful summary:

. . . it should be clear that the author of the CD never claims to be Paul himself. There have been many pseudo-Pauline writings in the fifth and sixth century, but whoever wrote the treatise DN did not claim to speak in Paul’s name. He deliberately wanted to be regarded and read as the mouthpiece of Dionysius the Areopagite, i.e., as a learned Greek educated in and highly influenced by Hellenic philosophy, and as someone who received Christian faith from the Apostle Paul.[45]

It is fitting to conclude with a statement from the Areopagite himself: “As far as I am concerned I have never spoken out against Greeks or any others. In my view, good men are satisfied to know and to proclaim as well as they can the truth itself as it really is.”[46]