In his book The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (New Haven, CT: Yale, 1974), Hans Frei gives a historical account of how the literal (once inseparable from the figurative meaning) and historical meaning of scripture (which up until this point were held together–pretty much since the beginning of the history of Christian exegesis) were gradually separated, and eventually set in opposition to one another in the 18th and 19th century. This is quite evident in the debates during this time concerning the New Testament’s usage of the Old Testament.
Frei spends a chapter discussing Anthony Collins, a staunch anti-christian deist, who argued that if the Old Testament prophecies concerning Christ were not ‘literally’ (in his redefined usage of the term literal–i.e., “. . . describes and refers to a state of affairs known or assumed on independent probable grounds to agree or disagree with the stated proposition.” (76)) fulfilled in the New Testament, then Christianity could not stand. The gist of his argument:
. . . if language is to be used in a ruled, rational way, propositions cannot mean several things at the same time, nor do statements refer to states of affairs that do not correspond to the features described by the statements, except in purely arbitrary application of someone claiming divine sanction for his perversion of thought and language. Typological or any other nonliteral interpretation cannot sit in judgment over the ordinary referential way statements using ideas of sensation make sense. (83-4)
In essence, Collins’ argument is either that the OT prophecies must be interpreted ‘literally’ (i.e., rationalistically) and the NT writers are found to be wrong, or if the OT prophecies are to be considered as fulfilled (Collins’ lumps a bunch of terms together: allegorically, typologically, figuratively, etc.), then they were fulfilled nonsensically, and, ultimately, it doesn’t matter. The alternatives: “Literal and false, or typological and meaningless” (70).
The pre-critical understanding of the ‘literal,’ was different from Collins’ own. To the Reformers and many of the Protestant scholastics,
The identity of literal and historical sense of scripture involves a cognate unity on the part of God: the divine author of the book is the same as the governor of the history narrated in it. Being both author of the text’s meaning and governor of actuality he unites meaning and fact, so that it does not occur to the orthodox interpreter that there is a distance between words and reference of such a sort that each has a status logically independent of the other.
A statement God makes and intends literally, naturally refers to the state of affairs described in it. A description he furnishes is itself the reference or does the duty for the latter. Moreover, in view of God’s providential governance there is no reason why a statement he makes should not describe two events at the same time, the one literally and the other by prefiguration [i.e., typologically]. (73-4)
The figural meaning of the text, then, was considered to be merely an extension of the literal meaning, and in no way opposed to it. Yet, with Collins redefining ‘literal’ (and others accepting his assumed definition) resulted in
. . . the complete separation of the literal and figurative (typical) senses. Figurative meaning, hitherto naturally congruent with literal meaning, now became its opposite. [. . .] Collins assigned the typical sense to the same class of reading as “mystical, or allegorical, or enigmatical sense.” The Reformers and the general tradition that came in their wake would have flatly denied this association of figuration allegory and insisted that the very opposite is true.
Unfortunately, few protested and most of Collin’s opponents blindly accepted his epistemological presuppositions. What eventually ended up happening is that those who sought to defend Scripture
. . . tended to regard obviously literal kinds of statements in the Bible as evidence of the truthfulness and integrity of human authors, and thus as proper evidence in favor of the historical factuality of their accounts. Orthodox interpreters prior to the days of the “new philosophy” had not used this argument. (Since then it has never ceased completely among theological apologists.)
For the older interpreters neither the human author (alone or together with his setting) nor the empirical-historical fact described by the statement had the logical distinctness or independence from the words of the statement that was necessary to make this kind of argument as well as the skeptical counterargument cogent. (80)
Frei finishes off the chapter pointing out how Collin’s philosophical base (which is representative of his time) set the stage for “the triumph of historical-critical interpretations of biblical narratives” (85). Not that merely rewinding the clock would solve anything, but it would do us well to pay careful heed to the hermeneutic of the early church fathers and Reformers, rather than dismiss much of their exegetical labor as arbitrary allegory, as many want to do, while failing to examine our own philosophical assumptions.